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Failing Firms and the Merger
Provisions of the Antitrust Laws
By G. E. HALE* AND ROSEmARY D. HALE*
Stringent tests are now applied in enforcing the prohibitions
against business mergers incorporated in the federal antitrust
laws.' Almost any acquisition is open to successful challenge
in the courts. In the language of a recent important decision:
Certainly it is evident that Congress intended to encompass minute acquisitions which tend toward monopoly and
to do so in their incipiency. Courts have recognized the
necessity to act toward a violation as it begins, rather than
wait until it has become a fait accompli.2
In addition,
the prohibitions have recently been extended to
"vertical" 3 and perhaps "conglomerate" mergers as well as those
involving competing companies. Hence the number of permissible purchasers of a going concern has been vastly reduced.
In these circumstances it is important to clarify exceptions
to the prohibition. One such exception-and possibly the only
important one-has long been recognized.4 It states that merger
* A.B., Yale College, 1935; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1938; J.S.D. University of Chicago, 1940; member of the Illinois bar.
**A.B., Mount Holyoke College, 1940; M.A., American University, 1956;
lecturer in economics, Lake Forest College.
' A bibliography of writings about the prohibitions of § 7 of the Clayton Act
and § 1 of the Sherman Act may be found in Oppenheim, Cases on Federal
Antitrust Laws 543 (2d ed. 1959). The statutes are found in 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1, 2 18.
United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 737 (E.D. Mo. 1959),
aff'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Note also United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957). The history of the 1950 amendments to § 7
is reviewed in note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: a Legislative History, 52 Colum.
L. Rev. 765 (1952). But cf. Att'y Gen. Nat'l. Comm. Antitrust Rep. 124-5 (1955);
United States v. Republic Steel, 11 F. Supp. 117, 118-9 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
3 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 309 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
4 International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291 (1930);
Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F.2d 875, 880-1 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 322 U.S.
743 (1944); Attorney General's National Committee, supra note 2, at 123; Note,
Horizontal Mergers and the "Failing Firm" Defense, 45 Va. L. Rev. 421, 423
(1959); Wiley, The "Failing Company", 41 B.U.L. Rev. 495, 497-9 (1961).
Adverse decisions are reported in Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 48 (1956);
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus, 206 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir.), affirming 114
F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953).
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is permissible when the acquired firm is failing. This exception
was the subject of a recent decision by the United States Supreme
Court. While perhaps narrowly interpreted, the exception does
not appear yet to have been repudiated.5
In legal terminology, the rationale of the exception is simple.
The statutory prohibition reads against mergers which may lessen competition. A firm about to fail affords no competition;
hence its acquisition cannot violate the antitrust laws. Such a
rationale does not, however, provide much guidance either to
the desirability of the exception or its scope. Perhaps it would
be preferable to let the failing firm fail. In any event, there is
ample room for argument as to what constitutes a failing condition.
Bankruptcy; pro and con
Mere mention of the word "bankruptcy" causes many a lawyer
to shudder.6 It is easy to envisage customers, creditors and em-

ployees caught in a catastrophe. Judicial liquidation evokes a
picture of drastic shrinkages in values. Costs of administration
appear high 7 and probable diversion of assets to other uses may

involve shocking losses.s
The Attorney General did not seek to enjoin the Nash-Hudson
merger out of which grew American Motors. Thus the facilities
of both firms remained within the automobile industry and that
result, both in theory and practice, has enhanced competition
in that area.' If one or both firms had been allowed to fall into

bankruptcy their assets might or might not have found continued employment in the manufacture of cars. Quite conceiv5 United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
6 United States v. Columbia Pictures, 169 F. Supp. 888, 896 (S.D. N.Y.
1959); Riehm & Billyou, A Comment on the ProposedNotice of Legislation, 2
Antitrust Bull. 195, 197-8 (1956); Attorney Generals National Committee, supra
note 2 at 124-5; Bok; Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 344-5 (1960); Weston, The Role of Mergers
in the Growth of Large Firms, 75 (1953); House Comm. on the Judiciary, The
Merger Movement in the Textile Industry, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1955).
7 Judicial Conference of the United States, Annual Report of the Proceeding
28-9, 312 (1959); Laughran, Costs of Bankruptcy Administration, 32 Ref. J.49,
50 (1958). In the Matter of Dominick Falduto, no. 58B 4914 (N.D. 11.1960),
is possibly a typical case of bankruptcy in the small business field. The files
thereof show that expenses of administration exceeded 20% of the available
assets; only 5.2198% of the claims of unsecured creditors were paid.
8 In economic terms, bankruptcy procedure involves "frictions" which may
prove extremely costly.
9 Kottke, Mergers of Large Manufacturing Companies, 41 Rev. Economics 430
(1959).
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ably their factories and tools might have been converted to the
production of farm implements or some other commodity. Thus
the desirability of the bankruptcy route may depend on whether
it is considered desirable to shrink the capacity of an industry.'
There is a good deal to be said-and during depressed times it
is often said-for the retirement of "excess" capacity. Machines
are idle in many industries today; steel is only one of many commodities which could be produced in far greater quantities
with existing plants. One could argue endlessly as to the cause of
such conditions. It is more difficult to urge that the courts should
recognize an exception to the antitrust laws which has the effect
of discouraging the re-allocation of idle resources into productive service. Block the merger and let the facilities drop out of
an industry which is equipped to manufacture more than can
be sold. Let Nash and Hudson, in other words, go on the auction
block. Let their factories start turning out lawn mowers, helicopters or some other product which new managers believe the public
is willing to buy. In that way factories can be made to hum again;
tools can be put to use in building products which consumers
really want.
It will be urged on the other hand that maintenance of
capacity within an industry is desirable in order to provide
continued downward pressure upon prices. This is the traditional thrust of antitrust. "Excess" capacity in an industry should
not be recognized; let producers reduce their prices, and the
"excess" will disappear. Whether prices can, in fact, be so
reduced and idle resources thus eliminated depends, of course,
upon the slope of the demand curve. That slope will vary from
industry to industry and, unfortunately, will always prove difficult of measurement. Antitrust, nevertheless, has never worried
about demand; it has always clung to faith in more competition.
Merged competition is regarded as better than less capacity.
So here, paradoxically, in the failing company exemption, competition is to be enhanced by not enforcing the Clayton Act;
merger is to be permitted in order to keep capacity within an
industry.
10 It is claimed that mobility among the largest business enterprises has been
reduced in recent years. Collins & Preston, The Size Structure of the Largest
Industrial Firms, 51 Am. Econ. Rev. 986, 1001 (1961). If so, measures designed
to promote exit from the industrial scene may be desirable.
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It is not necessary to rely on the doctrine of counter-vailing
power. By permitting Nash and Hudson to merge, General
Motors was subjected to greater competitive pressure. 1 We may
pass the point that the doctrine of counter-vailing power has
received a cool reception from the courts;' 2 it is immaterial that
Bethlehem's bid to acquire Youngstown so as to offer more
vigorous rivalry to "the corporation" was rejected. 13 For the exception, paradoxically, we repeat, flows inescapably from the
principal purport of Section 7.
Tests of "failing"
What we conclude about the merits of bankruptcy as a treatment for idle capacity may bear directly on the test to be applied
to ascertain whether a firm is in the "failing" category. Here the
recent Diebold decision is illuminating. In the trial court the
acquired firm was found to be "hopelessly insolvent'; accordingly,
the Attorney General's action was dismissed on motion for summary judgement.14 In the Supreme Court, however, the Attorney
General prevailed, the judgment being reversed and the cause
sent back for trial." It thus appears that the equity test is not
the measure of the "failing company" exception. Mere inability
to meet obligations does not call the exception into play; presumably there must be a showing that there is no possibility of
meeting obligations, even in the long run.16
If short term inability to pay bills does not bring the exception
into play, a fortiori a decision upon the part of the acquired firm
11 Thus in United States v. Republic Steel Co., 11 F. Supp. 117, 124 (N.D.
Ohio 1935) the court wrote:
The elimination in such cases of the competition between the merging
corporations is, in reality, a step in the strengthening of competition
between the units vitalized thereby and the general industry. Therefore,
instead of probability of injury to the public resulting from consummation of such merger the interest of the public will be enhanced.
See Bromley, Mergers and Acquisitions, 11 A.B.A. Antitrust Section Rep. 12, 16
(1957); Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 239 (1959); Bright,
The Electric Lamp Industry, 94 (1949).
1 American Crystal Sugar v. Cuban-American Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 399-400
(S.D. N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
13 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 163 F. Supp. 576, 607, 610, 615
(S.D. N.Y. 1958).
14 United States v. Diebold, 197 F. Supp. 902, 905-7 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
15 United States v. Diebold, 869 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Cf. United States v.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Assn., 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958); rev'd.,
362 U.S. 458 (1960); Pressed Steel Car Co., 16 F. Supp. 329, 339 (W.D. Pa.
1936).
16 Cf. Wiley, The "Failing Company", 41 B.U.L. Rev. 495, 504 (1961).
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to liquidate or to seek financial aid does not take a merger out
of the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. The Attorney General,
indeed, has taken the position that the acquired firm must have
made unsuccessful efforts to borrow before it will be deemed
"failing."' 8 On top of that, he insists that it make a bona fide
effort to sell out to someone other than the acquiring firm. The
latter requirement is troublesome in that no standards are set for
such a sale to another; i.e., at what price must such a sale be
attempted?" Beyond that, in view of decisions that even mergers
in the nature of vertical integration and diversification fall within
antitrust prohibitions, it is hard to envisage the identity of the
presumably immune acquiring firm.
One could take the opposite position and argue that the exception should be available to rescue failures in their "incipiency."
A firm may remain in business indefinitely although it fails to
cover total costs. By foregoing profits and permitting its property to depreciate, it may remain active for years. 2 Failure to
cover average costs is a more serious matter. Barring a shift in
demand or costs, the end is just a matter of time. Such circumstances have not usually brought the exception into play,21 although one older case may be cited in support of recognizing
"incipient" failure.
1
7Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n 291 F.2d 279, 280
(3d Cir. 1961); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n 296 F.2d 800,
805-6 (9th Cir. 1961); Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 284
F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 716 (1923).

1s Wiley, The "FailingCompany," 41 B.U.L. Rev. 507 (1961).
19Id. at 509; Friedman, Corporate Mergers & Acquisitions, S. Rep. No. 132,

Senate Committee on Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1957); Handler,
Fifteenth Annual Review, 17 The Record 411, 429 (1962). In United States v.
Diebold, 197 F. Supp. 902, 907 (S.D. Ohio 1961), Reversed 369 U.S. 654
(1962), the trial court, in a pplying the exception, laid some stress on the fact
that a competitor was the oaly person who had made a bona fide offer to acquire
the failing firm. In Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 291
F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961) the court pointed to the fact that there were other

bidders for the assets of the acquired company and hence refused to apply the
excepton.
0 Cf. Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 48 (1956).
2
1 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n 54 F.T.C. 769, aff'd,
296 F;2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961); Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade
Comm'n 284 F.2d 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923);
Wiley, The "Failing Company," 41 B.U.L. Rev. 421, 502-8 (1961); Note,

Horizontal Mergers and the "Failing Firm" Defense, 45 Va. L. Rev. 421, 424
(1959).
22 Jnited States v. Republic Steel Co., 11 F. Supp. 117, 119 (N.D. Ohio
1935). Apparently the only decision dealing with an unprofitable division of an
otherwise thriving corporation is Farm Journal, Inc. 53 F.T.C. 26 (1956), wherein

the exception was held inapplicable. For a view favoring such "incipiency" see
(Continued on next page)
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Analysis of tests
Can we learn anything by searching for the cause of the failing
firm's trouble? If so, what causes are likely to be found? Examination of cases would, no doubt, yield varied answers. In some
instances management has faltered, grown old and tired of the
treadmill. In others, changes of consumer taste, wrongly analyzed by management, have wrought havoc. In still others, reliance placed on antiquated production methods may be responsible. Myriad factors can operate to bring an enterprise into a
precarious predicament.
Those we have mentioned fall into the category of "imperfections." Predictions have been erroneous. Why? Perhaps they
were founded on inadequate information. Possibly the matter
lay outside human ken and someone simply guessed wrong.
Ignorance is the grand "imperfection." Others fall under the
headings of indivisibility, irrationality and immobility. All are
"frictions" preventing the free flow of resources to their most
efficient use. 3
Suppose that we can identify the cause of a firm's imminent

failure. We can diagnose the difficulty, give it a name, and thus
see the direction which the enterprise should have taken. Assume, for example, that the firm to be acquired has been brought
to the brink by a mistaken labor policy. Burdensome contracts
have been assumed; a heavy weight of "feather-bedding" must
be carried.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 226, 326 (1960). The author went on to say at p. 344:
It may well be . . . that many mergers which would normally be
prohibited should be freely allowed where there is a substantial likelihood that the acquired firm cannot survive independently, even though
its failure cannot reliably be described as probable.
See references to legislative history pointing in the same direction in Note,
Horizontal Mergers and the "Failing Firm" Defense, 45 Va. L. Rev. 421, 424
(1959). Cf. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 118-9 (N.D.
Ohio 1935); Federal Trade Commission, Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions
78-9 (1955); Carr, Alcoa: an American Enterprise 92, 101, 112 (1952); Emmett
& Jeuck, Catalogues & Counters 443-5 (1950).
2As to economies of scale consult Hale & Hale, Market Power § 3.13 (1958);
Loehwing, Through the Wringer 35 Barron's no. 28, July 11, 1955, p. 5; Cf.
Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 18, 71, 92, 261 (N.Y. 1959)
McKie, Tin cans and tin plate 297 (Harv. U. Press 1959); Floyd, Asset Size and
Yields on Invested Assets for U.S. Life Insurance Companies, 1 Q. Rev. Economics
& Business 87 (1961). A case of cost reduction is recounted in Merger Benefits
Grow at National-U.S. Radiator, 39 Barron's no. 13, Mar. 30, 1959, p. 34.
Consult Markham, Merger Policy, 43 Va. L. Rev. 489, 494 (1957).
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In addition to "imperfections," we must take account of "indivisibility." Many industries are characterized by economies of
scale. Such indivisibility takes many forms. There is a minimum
efficient size for a steel mill or a hospital. The case of the railroad
is pointed: there cannot be less than one single track right of
way from A to B. In its early years an industry may attract many
new entrants. As time goes by, factors of indivisibility, tangible
or otherwise, may appear; marginal firms will falter, and the once
rapidly expanding industry start to contract. 4
Having thus identified the ailment, are we in a better position to prescribe application of the "failing company" exception
to section 7 of the Clayton Act? The answer is affimative. If the
court can readily diagnose the problem, so can an outsider. The
outsider need not be a competitor. If all that ailed Nash was a
labor "bind," presumably funds could be raised from informed
investors, a new corporation organized to acquire the plant,
and the business resumed without the onerous labor contracts.
Again and again one sees existing enterprises looking for new
fields in which they may put their resources to work more
profitably. A vast machinery of investment bankers and securities exchanges is also available to tap savings destined for risk
ventures. If, then, the cause of the failing firm's difficulties can
readily be identified, there would appear to be no need to let a
competitor acquire its facilities in contravention of established
policy.
If, on the other hand, the disease is not readily diagnosed,
preservation of the enterprise may demand operation of the
exemption. And in many instances, we submit, the origin of the
prospective failure may be obscure. Multiple causes may have
been at work. To weigh them and determine which one might
have been important-and which of minor consequences-may
readily surpass judicial ingenuity. Obscurity often surrounds such
questions.
At this point we return to the Attorney General's insistence
that the failing firm be offered to third parties before it is merged
24

Cf. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Co., 152 F. Supp. 887,

396 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), affd, 259 F.2d 524
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576
denied 157 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 124 (N.D. Ohio

(2d Cir. 1958); United States v.
(S.D. N.Y. 1958), motion for SJ
But cf. United States v. Republic
1935).
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into a competitor. If the diseased enterprise is made available
to prospective investors and none shows an interest in its acquisition, the court may well draw an inference that the malady
has many causes, is not readily diagnosed, and even less easily
cured. Lack of investor interest is important evidence of the
serious character of the ailment and of the difficulties involved
in overcoming it. It does not necessarily follow that the court
cannot apply the exemption absent such a showing. Other evidence may be amply persuasive and it is not always advisable
to place a going concern on the auction block. Employee morale,
for example, may suffer if it becomes known that the enterprise
is "up for grabs."
We have been speaking primarily of "imperfections." If the
problem is diagnosed as one of indivisibility, the answer is simple.
For if merger is blocked, one (or, possibly, both) firm(s) must
leave the industry. Hence proof of important economies of scale,
subject to the foregoing observations with respect to the preservation of competition as opposed to the liquidation of "excess"
capacity, should call the exemption into play. The mere possibility that factors of indivisibility will eventually force firms
from an industry has not, obviously, brought the exception into
play. In other antitrust cases, however, the courts have not overlooked such factors.2 5
We have mentioned "imperfections" and indivisibilities which
may have crippled the failing firm. There is another possibility:
demand for its product may have changed. The enterprise may
have been managed with infinite wisdom, but if consumers won't
buy its product, financial trouble may be expected. We are speaking, for example, of the buggy maker. What should a court do
with such a case?
In some instances the plight of the buggy maker can actually
be ascribed to an imperfection. If its management had been
25 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
125, 142 (D. Mass. 1960) modified 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960) cert. denied,
365 U.S. 890 (1961); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F.2d 288, 309 (E.D.
Mo. 1931); Handler, A Study of the construction and enforcement of the federal
antitrust laws, T NE C Mnno. no. 38, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 55-6 (1941); Bowman, Incipiency, Mergers and the Size Question, 1 Antitrust Bull. 533, 540
(1956); Hale & Hale, Market Power § 3.13 (1958); Givens, Affirmative Benefits
of Industrial Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 Ind. L. 51, 58
(1960); House Comm. on the Judiciary, The Merger Movement in the Textile
Industry, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1955), (wave of mergers in textile industry
touched off by depression therein; "too many" mills).
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truly alert, the company would have shifted to the production
of automobiles. In such circumstances, the tests outlined above
are applicable.
There are, however, genuine cases of "dying industries." The
operator of an anthracite mine may not readily convert his plant
into the production of a more promising product. And, no matter how well managed, such a property may be attractive to few
investors. If, therefore, it can be shown that there has been a
genuine shift in the demand curve for the firm's product, plus
such degree of financial difficulty as may be thought necessary,
the exemption may, again, be called into play, and without
the necessity of showing that investors are not interested. If
demand has really changed, the capacity may no longer be required to serve consumers. Presumably, however, the managers
can perceive that fact and retire the more costly production
facilities in due course.
It is true that the several firms in a "dying industry" will each
be subject to "imperfections" in varying degrees. Some will be
well managed and enjoy a prospect of longer survival. Others,
for reasons which we have set out, will be due for quicker death.
That fact, however, does not alter the test we have proposed.
If demand has changed adversely, and if financial difficulties can
be established, no further showing is required to call the exemption into play.
Growth
In "underdeveloped" and "mature" nations alike there is much
talk today of encouraging economic growth. In many areas backward nations seek a "take-off." Here politicians promise to "get
the country moving again." If indivisibility permeates the economy, perhaps mergers should be encouraged rather than prohibited; possibly the "failing firm" exception is in need of great
expansion rather than its present restriction. Perhaps mergers
should be allowed whenever there are economies of scale. In
support of such a view there is some evidence that mergers are
more prevalent in growing than shrinking industries. 26 And if
an exception is needed to cushion the rigors of industrial death,
26
Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research 43, 78 (1959). Cf. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 18,
68, 162-3 (N.Y. 1959).
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why should it not be equally available to nourish the difficult
27
process of growth?
All that can be said on that subject is that it challenges the
fundamental concepts of antitrust policy. We are committed to
the idea that indivisibility excuses monopoly only in the public
utility field. If an enterprise is to avoid profit control, it can
receive no assistance by reducing competitive pressures. In the
free sector of the economy we insist upon competition."
Other factors
It has been suggested that the failing firm exception should be
more narrowly construed as the magnitude of the acquired company increases.2" Here no doubt concern is felt lest the acquisition actually affect competition, even if ruin is the alternative for
the acquired firm. Absolute size (wealth) is perhaps vaguely related to the peril of failure; the small, struggling firm may be
more likely to go under than the large, well established company. 0 The exception thus is likely to be called into play when
the acquiring concern is large. It follows that the acquired business will often be small. If, therefore, the exception is properly
recognized at all, it is difficult to understand why its application
should be limited to situations wherein the acquiring firm is
relatively or absolutely small. To do so amounts almost to an
elimination of the exception.
What is to be said, per contra, of the factor of entry? Lack
of barriers in the industry may logically lead to the conclusion
that no merger threatens competition. Potential competition may
27
Wiley, The "Failing Company," 41 B.U.L. Rev. 495, 508 (1961) (in two
cases need for exansion of acquiring company noted in consideration of
exception). Certainly the form of the arrangement for growth should not be
controlling. Carr, Alcoa: an American Enterprise 92, 103 (1952). Note also
that some acquisitions are "bargains." Harris, H. K. Porter's Interesting Growth
6ll (1955); Rieser, Consolidated Foods, 61
Product, 52 Fortune no. 3, 114,
Fortune no. 6, 139, 255 (1960); Pearose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm
18, 160
2 8 (1959).
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 616-7 (S.D.
1958).
N.Y. 29

Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 343 (1960); cf. Dewey, Monopoly in Economics and Law
224 (1959).
SO Kaplan, The Influence of Size of Firms, 40 Proc. American Economics
Ass'n 74, 75 (1950); Ferguson, The Relationship of Business Size to Stability: an
Empirical Approach, 9 J. of Ind. Econ. 43, 57 (1960).
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suffice for welfare purposes, and the courts have shown considerable awareness of that fact. 31 It does not follow that ease of
entry should enlarge the scope of the failing firm exception.
Economies of scale may be in operation; marginal firms may be
faced with failure; yet entry may be easy and consumers thus
amply protected against the toll of monopoly. Picture, for example, the individual grocer of a generation ago. There is no
greater scope for the exemption; either we prefer the bankof the exception; condiruptcy route or the gentler 3mechanism
2
tions of entry are irrelevant.
Conclusions
Offhand one might assume that a narrow reading of the exception would best promote a maximum amount of competition.
In the short ran that may be true. Over the long term, however,
as suggested above, forcing firms into bankruptcy is apt to result in their exit from the industry. In that event competition
will be reduced. Hence the highly restrictive suggestion of the
Diebold decision cannot be counted upon as a long run bulwark
against monopoly.
It does not follow that the statutory prohibitions should be
nullified in recognizing every "incipient" failure. Analysis of the
type set forth above should permit a discriminating application
of the exemption. It is true that the suggested tests are not automatic; they present a framework for the sifting of evidence and
a rationale for decision; they do not decide cases. Much room
31 United States v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 153, 200 (S.D. N.Y.
82, 89, 187 N.E. 813
1960); Moody & Waters v. Case-Moody Pie Corp., 354 Ill.
Crystal Sugar v. Cuban-American Co., 259 F.2d 524,
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is left for judging but less, perhaps, than when a court must
decide whether a defendant in a tort case has acted with due
care for the safety of others.
It may be thought that different considerations should apply
to mergers in the nature of integration or diversification. Here
the fear is not that competition may be reduced but, on the contrary, that it may become too intense. The merged firm, with
enlarged assets and greater absolute size (wealth), may simply be
able to outslug others in its field(s). Application of the exception
would also result, as indicated above, in a form of protectionism:

that is, the existing plant of the industry would be maintained.
Hence recognition of the exception may not be important except
to the extent that it raises the awesome question: who should
be protected from whom?

